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DIRECTOR
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Intelligence Information Handling Committee

Ad Hoc Study Group

REPORT OF THE ANALYST SUPPORT TASK FORCE

OBJECTIVES FOR IMPROVEMENT OF INFORMATION HANDLING IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

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REPORT OF THE ANALYST SUPPORT TASK FORCE FOR THE DCI'S INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION HANDLING COMMITTEE

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FOREWORD

Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 11905, and National Security Council Intelligence Directives, the Director of Central Intelligence established the Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC). Among the functions of the Committee is to promote and coordinate the development of Intelligence Community information handling capabilities which will provide on a timely basis relevant multi-source information. The purpose of this report is to provide an assessment of the needs of Community analysts for access to intelligence information and recommend ways to improve the sharing of such information.

The Report of the Analyst Support Task Force is the first publication in a series which bears the overall title of *Objectives for Improvement of Information Handling in the Intelligence Community.*

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report of the five member Analyst Support Task Force summarizes the results of the sample survey of intelligence production analysts conducted during the period from mid-September to mid-December 1978, and makes specific recommendations for solving some of the problems identified by these analysts. Although the report contains no new or particularly unusual observations, the survey data does document, perhaps for the first time, the perceptions of intelligence analysts about their production and information needs.

— Despite differences of production schedule, area and subject of interest, analysts expressed a common need for a rapid and easy access to all of the data available on the subjects or problems to which they were assigned.

RECOMMENDATION: Create a Community-wide, on-line, multi-source bibliographic index to Intelligence Community documents to be accessed either directly or through an information systems specialist.

RECOMMENDATION: Develop a catalog of automated Community files.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide on-line access to the full text of Intelligence Community products.

— Because of deficiencies in the distribution of source materials, personal contact with their colleagues is an essential source of information for analysts, yet administrative and technical problems often hamper such contact.

RECOMMENDATION: Build a directory of the Community's human resources for analysts to use in locating new contacts.

RECOMMENDATION: Develop a system of reporting all planned and ongoing analytical efforts throughout the Community to avoid duplication of analytical effort and facilitate coordination and exhange of information.

— Deficiencies in the present automated Community data bases—narrow focus, complexity, incomplete data, and lack of currency—lead analysts to duplicate data bases.

RECOMMENDATION: Press forward the ongoing effort to standardize and simplify data bases and protocols.

RECOMMENDATION: Identify and resolve problems contributing to the proliferation of similar data bases, starting with the many duplicative order-of-battle files.

REPORT OF THE ANALYST SUPPORT TASK FORCE

I. PURPOSE

25X1 The Analyst Support Task Force was convened in mid-September 1978 by the Chairman of the DCI's Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC):

— to survey the information needs of intelligence production analysts throughout the Intelligence Community,

— to evaluate the degree to which such needs are or could be satisfied through present or improved interagency mechanisms for sharing information or data bases—both automated and manual, and

— to recommend actions or further studies to improve the effectiveness of interagency information sharing.

25X1 The investigation seeks to determine if there exist unsatisfied requirements for information or access to data bases among a significant number of analysts and how any such requirements might best be met. In order to fulfill this broader goal, the task force focused upon answers to the following pertinent questions:

— What are the products of each type of analyst and where do these products fit in the chain of national intelligence production?

— What information sources and data bases are now used to produce these products, and how valuable are these sources and data bases to the analysts?

— Of those information sources and data bases identified, which are used exclusively by each analyst interviewed and which might be of value to other analysts in the Community?

— Which data bases or information sources available to others—either within or outside the Community (e.g., academia, libraries, etc.)—would be of significant value to those analysts who do not presently have access to such data bases or sources?

— What types of data bases that do not presently exist within the Intelligence Community would be of future value to the analysts?

— How must data bases be structured, updated, maintained and accessed to be of maximum value to the most analysts?

25X1 The complete statistical analysis of answers to these and other questions asked by the survey was prepared by the contractor and is entitled: "A Statistical Analysis of Analyst Support Task Force Interviews" (S/NF), hereafter called the "Presearch Report."

II. METHODOLOGY

25X1 The Task Force consisted of five members detailed from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and from the Community On-Line Intelligence System (COINS) and CIA Support for the Analyst File Environment (SAFE) Project Management Offices. These personnel served as technical experts on the subject of analyst information requirements rather than as representatives of the positions of their parent organizations. Four of the five members are, or have been, intelligence analysts.

25X1 The Task Force effort was assisted by a contractor, Presearch, Inc., who prepared the initial plan for the project and reviewed recent analyst requirements studies prior to the first meeting of the Task Force members. A major feature of the Presearch plan was a two-phase analyst interview process. First a limited number of senior analysts would be interviewed in each agency. After consideration of the results and refinement of the interview process itself, a larger sample of working level intelligence production analysts would be interviewed.

25X1 Guidance from the Chairman of the DCI Intelligence Information Handling Committee was that the principal effort should be directed towards CIA, DIA, and NSA, but other Washington-area intelligence production organizations would be included as time and resources permitted. Thus, analysts were also interviewed at Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and in the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center (NOSIC), Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) and the Intelligence Analysis Division of the Naval Field Operational Intelligence Office (NFOIO/IAD). At CIA, the working-level interviews were restricted to the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC); at DIA to the Vice Directorate for Production (VP)—NFAC and VP being the primary analysis components of these agencies. Although other members of the Intelligence Community responsible for intelligence analysis were not included in the survey—for example, Drug Enforcement Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation—the similarity in responses among the analysts who were interviewed leads to the conclusion that the survey findings probably would apply to most analysts of foreign intelligence.

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The Task Force members and Presearch consultants reworked the original project plan to include the following:

— Review of previous studies: Task Force members extensively reviewed the DIA/SAFE documentation in order to avoid duplication of this on-going effort, in addition to the contractors review of previous analyst information requirements studies to identify data useful to this project that would not have to be recompiled and to determine any gaps in the previous studies which needed to be filled.

— Data base catalog design: Presearch compiled a catalog of automated intelligence data bases available in the Community, based on material in the Report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Community Information Handling and the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) Catalog of Automated Intelligence Files, but organized by substantive subject categories. This catalog was shown to the interviewees to ascertain their interest in accessing such automated files.

— Interview design: Presearch designed the questionnaire for the senior analyst interviews.

— Identification of senior analysts: Presearch and the Task Force obtained from each agency of the Washington-area Intelligence Community a list of senior analysts capable of representing the information needs, opinions, and problems of analysts within the major production elements of their respective agencies.

— Senior analyst interviews: Presearch consultants and Task Force members conducted 43 interviews with senior analysts at CIA, DIA, NSA, NOSIC and Department of State/INR.

— Analysis of interview data: The Task Force reviewed the completed interviews and statistical data compiled by Presearch to determine both the selection of working-level analyst interviewees and any changes required in the interview questionnaire.

— Redesign of interview questionnaire: For the working-level analyst interviews, many questions no longer felt to be pertinent were omitted while other questions were asked in greater detail. (Presearch Report—Appendix A—UNCLASSIFIED)

— Redesign of data base catalog: Presearch revised the automated data base catalog to contain a more complete description of the data bases, file sponsor information, etc., entitled: "Catalog of Automated Intelligence Production Files Within the Intelligence Community" (SECRET/NOFORN) and "Compartmented Supplement to the Catalog" (SECRET/CODEWORD)

— Selection of working-level analyst interviewees: The Task Force determined that at least one production analyst should be interviewed in each production component of each agency and more than one interview conducted in those components not represented in the senior analyst interviews or from which inadequate information had been obtained during those interviews. Each agency was asked to nominate interview candidates who had at least two years experience in their current positions and were representative of the analysts in their component as to information needs and automated system use. This procedure resulted in a three percent sample, based on available analyst population figures. Organization charts for CIA/NFAC, DIA/VP, NSA, State/INR and Naval Intelligence organizations are appended to the Presearch Report (Appendix C—CONFIDENTIAL) and coded to indicate representation in the interview sample.

— Working-level analyst interviews: The Task Force and Presearch conducted 127 interviews with working-level analysts—43 at CIA, 32 at NSA, 34 at DIA, 4 at INR and 14 at Navy (NISC, NOSIC and NFOIO). Of these interviews, five were discounted—three at CIA, one at NSA, and one at DIA—because the interviewees were not intelligence production analysts (three were information systems specialists, one was a requirements officer, and one was an indications and warning system development officer).

— Preliminary analysis of the interview data: The Task Force members spent two weeks compiling and analyzing the data from the working-level analyst interviews in preparation for writing the draft report.

— Draft reports: A preliminary draft report was compiled from contributions provided by the individual Task Force members following discussions of the results of the preliminary analysis, and the members returned to their parent organizations on termination of their respective detail periods. Copies of this report were provided to the Chairman of the Intelligence Handling Committee for review, to each Task Force member for coordination and to the contractor for modification in light of the refined statistical analysis. Revised drafts were produced as comments were received.

— Refined statistical analysis: Presearch automated and performed a more refined analysis of the data from the working-level analyst interviews, following the initial analysis done by the Task Force, and published that effort as "A Statistical Analysis of the Analyst Support Task Force Interviews" (S/NF). The original data is available in either tape or print-out form.

— Final report: Once the refined statistical analysis of the data had been completed, the Task Force members and Presearch consultants reconvened on March 16 and April 25, 1979, to improve the original draft report written by the Task Force to include the refined analysis and new insights. This report contains their best efforts to understand and explain the Intelligence Community production analyst's working environment, information needs and problems, and to recommend solutions to those problems. Some of the observations and judgments contained in the report are based upon the previous experiences of the Task Force members, as well as the information gathered during the survey. Some observations were derived from the comments of the analyst interviewees and are not readily available from the quantitative analysis of the data found in the Presearch report.

III. THE ANALYST ENVIRONMENT

25X1 Although many within the Intelligence Community process intelligence data and perform vital improvements to that data—cryptologists, translators, and signals processors, to name a few—the survey was limited to intelligence production analysts. The work of over 3,000 production analysts follows the steps of data processing and enhancement. The production analyst *combines* each piece of new data, often from multiple sources, with previous information; *selects* that data which augments the security of the United States by improving the policymaker's understanding of the capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions of foreign governments, groups, or individuals; *evaluates* the validity of both the new and old data; *interprets* the meaning hidden in the evaluated information; and *reports* that meaning clearly and concisely to other analysts and policymakers in such a way that the significance to US security interests is obvious.

25X1 The products of these analysts range from quick response memos and oral briefings through lengthy, written studies to automated data bases. The scope ranges from reporting a single event through a periodic situation update or detailed analyses of long-range trends. The analysts interviewed covered geographic areas worldwide and virtually all subjects—political, economic, military, science and technology—although they spent the majority of their time on military or scientific and technical subjects—45 percent and 22 percent, respectively. These analysts use information derived from signals, photography, human sources and publications—including those in foreign languages. Despite these differences of product deadline, area, and subject, the analysts interviewed expressed a common need for access to all of the data obtainable on the subjects or problems to which they are assigned.

25X1 A substantial part of each analyst's day is spent reading and evaluating a huge volume of routinely distributed source materials, largely consisting of reports that result from the collection and processing activities managed by each of the Intelligence Community agencies. These source materials are frequently distributed between these agencies by electrical means. Analysts in CIA, State/INR and NSA receive additional source materials which are not released outside their own agencies. Internal distribution procedures vary with the organization and the source; the most common, however, is to match document content—often done automatically—against interest profiles submitted by each potential recipient's office.

25X1 The production efforts of most of the analysts interviewed involve varying time deadlines and different degrees of research. Overall, however, current intelligence—with deadlines of a few hours or at most several days—consumes 30 percent of the production time while 47 percent of the analysts' time is spent on term or research analysis. Many analysts complained, in fact, that servicing frequent ad hoc requirements—which may range from quick response analyses of current situations to summaries of historical data—increasingly prevents them from needed research or thorough digestion of the daily deluge of source materials. Task Force interviewers sensed during the interviews that some analysts feel under pressure from managers to produce quickly and in quantity as a measurement of performance.

25X1 In order to respond to a wide range of production deadlines, nearly all the analysts interviewed maintain either personal or office-level working files which give them both quick and easy access to the most current data as well as access to data that may be years old. These files are generally manual, use analyst-devised, usually multi-subject indexing systems, and contain material processed daily from the routinely distributed source materials plus the results of previous production efforts. These all-source, multi-subject personal and office files are considered by the analysts interviewed to be the most valuable collection of data used—ranking above all agency, Community and non-community files presently available to the analysts.

25X1 Although many analysts believe that they never have all the information they should have, most feel that the information routinely distributed to them is adequate to do the job—or even excessive in volume. They spend so much time processing the daily source materials that they rarely have time to search out additional, hopefully, superior sources of data. As a result, those interviewed were often unaware of existing internal and external information resources, including automated files, that might be helpful to them.

25X1 Information sources which production analysts find most valuable have in common the characteristics of timeliness, convenience,

and dependability. The degree of timeliness needed varies according to product deadline, but the already documented emphasis on current intelligence and quick response, ad hoc requirements enchances the need for rapid access to information. The information source must also be convenient to use—complex data retrieval systems, whether manual or automated, introduce delay and discourage analyst use. Analysts value dependable sources and procedures for obtaining additional information because they rarely have time to query a source or system more than once. By far, the most valuable data gathering tool to those interviewed is the telephone, without which analysts could not maintain the personal contacts which they feel are an essential source of timely, convenient and dependable information.

IV. COMMUNITY DATA SHARING

25X1 The Analyst Support Task Force survey results clearly indicate that analysts need to share data with each other both informally as well as through the formal, official mechanisms of distribution and coordination. Over 58 percent of the production analysts interviewed rank personal contact with colleagues in other agencies as an essential source of intelligence information; another 24 percent found such contacts to be important.* At DIA, all of the 33 analysts interviewed rank personal contact as either essential or important. Averaging evaluations from analysts throughout the Community, the top six sources of intelligence information ranked as follows:

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25X1 Personal contacts can be maintained through formal and official channels—estimate coordination meetings, seminars, etc.—but most successfully occur through informal meetings or ad hoc telephone conversations. Analysts from different agencies concerned with the same subject or area meet to exchange ideas, keep each other informed and discuss analytical problems. The survey identified a few of these periodic "symposia" dealing with Korean naval issues, China, and Cuban military capabilities—all of which were praised as valuable by the participating analysts. In addition to these informal meetings, most

* Academic studies have found that information discussion is one of the two most useful sources of information for almost everyone, the other source being the written word. Informal discussions are preferred because of ease of accessability and use. (See *Introduction to Reference Work*, Vol II, by William A. Katz, 1978, page 51.)

of the anlysts interviewed know at least some of their counterparts in other agencies and are in regular telephone contact with them.

25X1 Precise data, as well as ideas and analytical opinions are exchanged through personal contacts. Even analysts who have direct access to automated data bases asserted that the best source for timely and accurate information is often the analyst who maintains the data base rather than the data base itself. This is particularly true for indications/warning and current intelligence analysts, for whom the press of production deadlines precludes waiting for distribution or data base updating systems to deliver the most recent information.

25X1 Despite its almost universal importance, however, analyst-to-analyst communication primarily depends on the analyst's initiative rather than any official procedure or even assistance. In fact, about 5 percent of the analysts interviewed—all located at NSA or Navy—complained of various administrative or mechanical obstructions to their personal contacts with colleagues at other agencies. In some NSA components, communication is inhibited by requirements that personal contacts be coordinated with management. Several Navy analysts complained of inadequate secure telephone links to other agencies. At INR, all secure telephones are located in a restricted area separate from the analysts' offices—an inconvenience not only to the INR analysts but also for their colleagues in other agencies who may wish to consult them on classified matters or coordinate classified reports.

25X1 Throughout the Community, the exchange of information is tacitly hampered by the lack of directories of human and data resources. Nearly one-third of the analysts interviewed commented that they were often unaware of where or how to get additional data beyond that which was routinely distributed to them. They complained also of not knowing where or how to find additional experts within the Community other than those with whom they were already in contact. More specifically, many decried the lack of a Community procedure for reporting what data or analytical reports are forthcoming, the absence of which leads to duplication of analytical effort and analysis that may be invalidated, even as it is disseminated, by more accurate or current information. Many of those interviewed were surprised at the number of the files described in the Presearch catalog of the Community's automated data bases ("Catalog of Automated Intelligence Production Files Within the Intelligence Community," SECRET/NOFORN). They were not aware that many of these data bases exist—including some that belong to other organizations, but deal with their own subjects of expertise.

25X1 Notwithstanding obstacles to informal communications created by design or default, analysts continue to rely on personal contacts in order to overcome perceived deficiencies in the routine dissemination

of source materials, as discussed in the previous section. Because intra-agency distribution policies and procedures vary, analysts may not have access to the same source materials that their colleagues in other agencies see and use. Such discrepancies in distribution impede the coordination process and may result in uninformed analysis.

25X1 About 15 percent of the analysts interviewed complained of problems with their internal distribution system which may involve interagency shared materials. At DIA, NSA and INR, analysts mentioned security procedures which require them to review some source materials in central, specially secured areas and which prohibit the materials from being removed to the analyst's desk. In some offices, source materials are distributed to components or supervisors and may not filter down to an interested analyst. The interviews also revealed that some analysts do not participate in the setting of requirements for information collection or distribution and that analysts occasionally do not even know how to get on the distribution list for particular source materials available to them.

25X1 Except for the concern of some CIA analysts that they were not routinely seeing NODIS State Department cables, the CIA analysts interviewed did not express as many problems with the internal distribution of source materials as did DIA and NSA analysts. At CIA, the AEGIS/RECON system—an automated bibliographic index to documents—provides CIA analysts with a back-up that gives them relatively quick access to most source materials received and distributed by CIA. AEGIS is the most widely used data base among those analysts interviewed at CIA—over 72 percent of the analysts interviewed had used it. AEGIS/RECON is not an alternative to the distribution network, however, since documents may take up to a week to be indexed into the system, some documents do not regularly appear in the files, and the analysts must often wait several days for copies of the source documents they have identified from the automated index.

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25X1 About 8 percent of the analysts interviewed complained that CIA does not disseminate all of the valuable human intelligence (HUMINT) it collects, or unnecessarily caveats some reports so that many analysts do not have ready access to the data. Indeed, the largest single complaint about unnecessary or illogical classifications involved the CIA's use of ORCON (originator controlled) and NOCONTRACT (not releasable to contractors) on its intelligence reports. These complaints are discussed more fully in Section VI—OTHER PROBLEM AREAS.

V. DEFICIENCIES IN DATA BASES

25X1 Analysts structure and store either source materials or data gleaned from these source materials in both manual and automated files. According to the survey sample, manual personal and office files predominate. The automated files in use have often evolved from manual data bases, and many of the original manual files are still retained as back-ups—even after automation. Many of the Community's automated data bases originated in much the same way—that is, manual data bases designed to meet the needs of specific users doing specific functions that have been automated, and occasionally broadened slightly in scope.

25X1 In general, however, the Community's automated files remain narrowly focused in subject and function, largely because those data bases used by analysts dealing with priority areas and subjects—as defined by the Key Intelligence Questions—were the first to be designed and/or automated and made available in the Community. These priority areas include the USSR, Eastern Europe and China; the priority subjects are military (specifically, order of battle and intentions) and science and technology (especially, installations and weapons research). Analysts who work on other areas or subjects have fewer automated data bases at their disposal, and have been less likely to get their manual data bases automated.

25X1 Perhaps because many of the Community's automated data bases focus on a single subject or function, relatively few analysts use any given data base—with the following exceptions. Those analysts who do use Community automated data bases, however, generally value them highly and use them intensively—as can be seen in COINS usage statistics. Only 22 percent of the NSA analysts interviewed use the IDF file, for example, yet the COINS PMO registered 25,397 queries from NSA to that file in 1977. If the survey sample represents total NSA analyst direct use of the IDF file, about 158 NSA analysts queried the

IDF file through COINS an average of 160 times each in 1977. Similar statistics can be compiled for the other most active Community files.

25X1 The most highly acclaimed and widely used Community data bases are those that are multi-subject or bibliographic rather than those oriented toward a specific substantive subject or area. The SIGINT On-Line Intelligence System (SOLIS) file is used regularly—at least once a month—by 36 percent of the analysts interviewed and is ranked as "essential" by 50 percent of those users. Another 35 percent of the SOLIS users rank the file "important." Not surprisingly, SOLIS is used most heavily by NSA analysts where 74 percent of those interviewed use the file.

25X1 The second most widely used data base is CIA's AEGIS. About 31 percent of all analysts interviewed regularly use AEGIS—the bulk of those users at CIA and the remainder at NSA where AEGIS is accessed through project MILLSTREAM in a non-automated way. At DIA, 36 percent of the analysts interviewed used SOLIS; and the various DIAOLS files are next most widely used with nearly one-third using the Automated Installations File (AIF/INSTA). Over 15 percent of all the analysts interviewed use the IDF File, but only those at CIA—17 percent of the analysts interviewed there—access that data base directly while DIA and NSA analysts access IDF through the COINS network themselves or use an intermediary. Complete statistics on automated file usage and evaluations of those files by the analysts interviewed can be found in the Presearch Report.

25X1 The ADP Subcommittee of the IHC is currently considering a proposal made by the CIA's Office of Central Reference and IHC representative that the RECON/ADSTAR system—an on-line multi-source and multi-subject bibliographic index of intelligence documents backed up by a microfilm document retrieval system—be made available to Community analysts. The RECON/ADSTAR systems would give analysts nearly the same capability CIA analysts presently have using the AEGIS system. The survey findings indicate, however, that the majority of analysts would probably prefer to access such a system through an intermediary.

25X1 Over half of the analysts interviewed prefer not to access unfamiliar automated information systems directly but use them only through specialists in their reference or library components or through other analysts. These secondary users may not know which files the specialists query in order to obtain the data or documents needed, and the survey did not interview information specialists. Thus, the statistics for total automated file usage will be greater than the figures for direct automated file use by the analysts surveyed.

25X1 The interviews also reveal that more analysts would try to use automated data bases but for the deficiencies they perceive in them. These deficiencies include:

— difficult access and/or use,
— time-consuming,
— incomplete data,
— lack of currency,
— rigid and inadequate file structures.

Roughly 10 percent of the analysts interviewed complained that existing automated data bases are difficult to use, either because the system protocols are too complex and too numerous or because terminals are too few or are inconveniently located. In addition to the 39 percent who said they always preferred to access automated data bases through information systems specialists, another 20 percent of the analysts stated that they would use automated data bases themselves only if those were simple and/or were used regularly.

25X1 Other analysts complained that data they need is excluded from some automated files either because of compartmentation or dissemination restrictions or because confirmation of data by a second source is required before that data can be entered. Files that are not consistently maintained constitute another problem for analysts who may not be aware of an individual file's maintenance status.

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the Community's files were automated before the sponsoring agencies acquired modern data base management techniques.

25X1 [redacted] Many of the existing automated file structures also preclude the storing of historical data—the file record reflects only the current status of a situation, object, or personality and thus is of little use as a research tool.

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25X1 [redacted] The DIA has been working to develop and implement a standardized order of battle product that meets the needs of both

national-level policymakers and military commanders. Under this Delegated Production Program (DPP), support of the order of battle data base would be shared between DIA and certain Unified and Specified Command elements. However, the resultant data base probably will not meet the needs of many Intelligence Community analysts, and working-level order of battle files will continue to proliferate. A number of separate ELINT data bases also exist largely for the same reasons order of battle data bases have proliferated.

25X1 Although there was no overwhelming request from the analysts interviewed for access to any existing automated data base or system, several analysts in CIA, DIA and NSA expressed an interest in using the Navy's SEAWATCH system.

25X1 Other analysts complained of specific problems with automated systems they already use. Interviewees who use the CIRC II system of the Air Force's Foreign Technology Division (FTD) felt that the time lag of one to several weeks between making a query and receiving the hard copy document is excessive. Material classified SECRET or below takes from eight to ten days to reach analysts and compartmented documents can take two weeks or more. Since a single answer to a query can involve material from several levels of classification, the analyst often gets his answers back in segmented portions, days or weeks apart. The installation of high speed printers at agencies where CIRC II is regularly used might solve some of the document delivery tie-ups if security problems could be overcome.

VI. OTHER PROBLEM AREAS

25X1 In addition to the snags in information handling and sharing already discussed, other problems were also identified which impinge directly on analyst access to and use of intelligence data. As has been previously noted, many automated files are incomplete and thus of reduced value to production analysts because material of higher classification or with caveats is excluded from the file. Other files are comparatively useless because they are so highly classified—restrictions on any of the information in the files are applied to the whole file. Many of the analysts interviewed remarked that the use of ORCON, WNINTEL, NOCONTRACT and NOFORN caveats is increasing and that the difficulties of Community data sharing is increasing proportionately.

25X1 Another file classification problem the Task Force encountered was the tendency by analysts and managers alike to classify the name and description of an automated file at the same level as the most highly classified data contained in the file. For this reason, knowledge of the capabilities or even existence of many automated files has been limited to the immediate analysts who maintain the file.

25X1 The Privacy Act prohibits reference to United States citizens or companies owned by US citizens in intelligence products or files. At NSA, for example, publication of an intercepted message is stopped if names mentioned in it are determined to be US citizens or companies. The same person or company must be reidentified on each occurrence however, because of the Privacy Act. The authority to build files of US names and companies—merely for identification purposes—would save hours of repetitive research effort and speed up the production of SIGINT product.

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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

25X1 The following recommendations are based on consideration of the results of the interviews, discussed previously, and are arranged in perceived order of importance under two categories near-term (in one to three years) and long-term (expected to require more than three years) implementation.

A. Near-term actions to facilitate analyst awareness of and access to intelligence information resources

25X1 1. Standard on-line bibliographic references—Develop a standard, on-line bibliographic reference system for all intelligence source materials, including finished intelligence projects. The following specific issues need to be resolved, however:

a. Structure—The system should provide a flexible capability for indexing on a concept, subject or key word basis and analyst users should be able to modify or add to the index terms assigned to the documents by the primary document indexers.

b. Currency—The time required between publication of an intelligence document and the availability of the bibliographic

record should be reduced to a minimum, possibly by introducing word processing technology into the traditionally manual document indexing techniques.

c. Full Text—The system should be able to display to analysts the full text of documents chosen from the bibliographic references quickly and conveniently without undue delay or complicated display procedures. This issue dovetails with Recommendation B.1 concerning on-line access to the full text of all Community documents.

d. Applications—Applications of the bibliographic reference to supplement other functions, such as user profile distribution of source materials, should be investigated. Once term research analysts are convinced that such a system will reliably retrieve all data available on needed subjects, the system could be enhanced to permit canned queries to bring the latest information to the user's attention daily.

e. Timing—A phased plan should be produced for implementing these recommendations.

25X1 2. Analyst contacts directory—Develop a directory of country and subject/issue Intellgence Community working-level points-of-contact as a resource tool for analysts in establishing ties in other agencies. The directory should include all substantive subjects of interest to the Community and all types of analysts—although names need not be listed in order to avoid security and privacy complications and to reduce the need for frequent updates. (Space should be provided for the analysts to write in the name of contacts, once known.) The directory should be distributed to all analysts in hard copy form but if prepared on word processing equipment could also be made available to the Community in an on-line automated file.

25X1 3. Community automated data bases catalog—Develop a catalog of Community automated data bases indexed by country/area and subject. At a minimum, it must contain adequate descriptions of the contents of the automated files, information about the availability of users guides and points-of-contact for file use. The catalog compiled by Presearch, Inc., during the course of this study, in conjunction with the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) catalog, could provide a foundation for a new publication. Procedures for updating the catalog should be directed by the Information Resources Office of the DCI Resource Management Staff with the help of the Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC), and it should be available both in hard copy and, ultimately, as an on-line file.

25X1 4. Ongoing and planned intelligence production reports—Develop a system to report ongoing and planned Intelligence Commu-

nity analytical reports, studies and contractor efforts in order to reduce duplicative research and facilitate coordination of analysis. The DIA-published Register of Intelligence Publications and Scientific and Technical Intelligence Register (RIP/STIR) and existing automated reference files of ELINT contractor studies are potential building blocks for such a system.

25X1 5. Privacy Act clarification—The Information Resources Office, through the Director of Central Intelligence, should seek a clarification of what real limits are imposed on Intelligence Community files and their use by the Privacy Act.

25X1 6 Classification of records—The practice of assigning the same classification and dissemination restrictions to abstracted bibliographic records that is assigned to a full document prevents analysts from learning of the existence of reports that may be pertinent to their mission and function. Bibliographic records and catalogs of available data bases should be studied to insure that they show the classification and handling restrictions of the document or data base but, in most cases, should not themselves be so classified or restricted.

25X1 7. CIRC II output—CIRC II system managers at FTD should be urged to investigate the problem of inordinate lag time between query and document receipt and determine if it can be resolved, perhaps by some means of direct data transmission and local high speed printing.

B. Follow-on studies and long-term actions

25X1 1. On-line access to Intelligence Community products—Initiate studies to make the full text of published source materials and other Community products available directly to analysts in an on-line, multi-source and multi-subject system. An interim and minimum approach would be that information service components within the Community should have direct access to such files, recognizing existing problems in providing remote access and additional terminals to current automated systems. Such a system would provide a solution to many of the distribution and communication problems mentioned by analysts. Because of high analyst-user satisfaction with the SOLIS system, the Task Force feels that SOLIS might serve as an initial prototype.

25X1 The information resource office of the various agencies, however, should initiate a study to determine the long-range requirements for full text, on-line access to Community products and source materials and how such a capability should relate to the standard

bibliographic system proposed in Section A of these recommendations. Accurate sizing and growth rates should be determined for these data bases and the relative advantages of a large centralized system versus decentralized local systems should be carefully weighed.

25X1 2. On-line data base language simplification—Ongoing efforts to standardize data elements, file structures and system protocols must be pressed. Development of multi-language retrieval systems (such as ADAPT—the ARPA Data Base Access and Presentation Terminal) or natural language systems are also necessary if intelligence analysts are to make effective use of the many and varied automated data bases available in the Community.

25X1 3. Proliferation of data bases—Identify and resolve problems contributing to the proliferation of similar data bases, both automated and manual. Files extracts which serve to provide local access to a remote master file are not the concern. The issue is redundancy which competes for system and manpower resources. Economies in effort should be possible with attention to the minimum number of variations meeting the needs of the maximum number of users including working-level analysts.

25X1

The Information Resources Office has underway a pilot baseline ELINT data flow study which is expected to provide a more in-depth view of ELINT processing and production than was possible in this study. The Task Force recommends that this forthcoming report be used as a basis for developing more specific recommendations than would be advisable here.

25X1 4. SEAWATCH access—Determine the need for analyst access to SEAWATCH and the impact on the present Navy computer system of expanding the present, limited access. Analysts in CIA, DIA and NSA expressed a need for direct access to this data.

25X1 5. Manual data base catalog—Study the practicality and desirability of creating a catalog of manual data base files, including personal and office files existing in the Community, similar to the NSA

Guide to T12 Collection.* Data collected by the Task Force provides an indication of the plethora of such files, which might be of wider value were their existence known.

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* This document, produced for internal NSA use, is a catalog of manual and automated library and office files. Copies may be obtained from NSA, T12

25X1